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“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial dis-
eases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman.” —Justice Louis D. Brandeis
IT did not take long for the realization to sink in that the paradigm ofU.S. foreign policy had shifted. In fact, it would be more accurate tosay that the new paradigm was forced in. Addressing the Joint Ses-
sion of Congress and the American people just nine days after the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks (9/11), President George W. Bush repeatedly
used the phrase “war on terrorism” to chart a new course of U.S. foreign
policy that would “include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert op-
erations, secret even in success.”1 One such covert operation that ex-
panded after 9/11 is the CIA’s Extraordinary Rendition Program, which
involves the abduction and subsequent extrajudicial transfer of suspected
terrorists to foreign countries for detention and interrogation.2 Extraordi-
nary rendition became an important feature of the government’s strategy
post-9/11 and included at least 136 individual detainees and participation
from more than 50 foreign governments.3
Plaintiffs alleging to be innocent victims of extraordinary rendition and
asserting causes of action against the government and private defendants
on constitutional, tort, and international law grounds have routinely had
their claims dismissed at the outset by federal courts.4 The cause for dis-
missal? The state secrets privilege—a common law evidentiary privilege,
the modern articulation of which was set forth by the Supreme Court in
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1. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address to a Joint Session of
Congress and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html) [https://perma.cc/22XS-2X3Y].
2. Robert Johnson, Note, Extraordinary Rendition: A Wrong Without a Right, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (2009).
3. Jonathan Horowitz & Stacy Cammarano, 20 Extraordinary Facts about CIA Ex-
traordinary Rendition and Secret Detention, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS (Feb. 5, 2013),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/20-extraordinary-facts-about-cia-extraordi-
nary-rendition-and-secret-detention [https://perma.cc/3WEP-3PH4].
4. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010); El-
Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007).
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United States v. Reynolds.5 The government has invoked this privilege
with such success that “[t]o date, not a single case brought by an ex-
traordinary rendition victim has reached the merits stage in a U.S.
court.”6 To understand the harsh reality impacting plaintiffs who have
been processed through the Extraordinary Rendition Program, consider
the following illustration.
Imagine traveling abroad on business or visiting an ailing relative
when, suddenly, agents of the country you are visiting seize you for rea-
sons that you cannot contemplate, while speaking to you in a language
that you do not know, all while denying your repeated requests to speak
with a translator, an attorney, your spouse, or the local consulate of your
home country.7 Imagine further that this episode marks the beginning of
a brutal saga of detention, interrogation, and torture that will last more
than two years, leaving you physically emaciated, emotionally trauma-
tized, and psychologically scarred.8 And, finally, imagine that your cap-
tors admit to you shortly before your release that although they had
determined that your detention was a mistake much earlier, the U.S. gov-
ernment had up until then denied permission for your release for no ap-
parent reason.9
Victims of extraordinary rendition have alleged being subjected to a
variety of interrogation methods that are prohibited under U.S. and inter-
national law at the hands of CIA officials operating “black site[s]” or
“dark prison[s].”10 The treatment is degrading: victims have been
stripped naked, blindfolded, shackled, and forced to make recorded false
confessions.11 The physical pain and psychological torment are severe:
they have been deprived of sleep and food; subjected to loud noise and
blinding light twenty-four hours a day; cut from head to toe with a scalpel
for the purpose of pouring hot stinging liquids into the open wounds; and
shocked with electrodes on ear lobes, nipples, and genitals.12 The results
are unspeakable: victims, having been told by their captors that they were
innocent, have emerged forty to sixty pounds lighter and returned home
only to find that their family has moved a continent away, believing they
had been abandoned.13
In a broad sense, courts have recognized the inherent unfairness to in-
dividual litigants of the loss of key evidence or the dismissal of their en-
5. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (explaining that occasion for
the privilege is appropriate where, “from all the circumstances of the case, [ ] there is a
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military [or state] matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged”).
6.  OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, GLOBALIZING TORTURE: CIA SECRET DETENTION
AND EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 20 (2013).
7. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1074–75; El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532
(E.D. Va. 2006).
8. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1073–75; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 532–34.
9. See El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
10. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1073–75; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 532–34.
11. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1073–75; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 532–34.
12. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1073–75; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 532–34.
13. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1073–75; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 532–34.
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tire case because of the state secrets privilege.14 Yet their decisions have
rested on the assumption that this is acceptable “in order to protect a
greater public value”: the security of the nation.15 This article does not
dispute that the collective interest in national security is supremely im-
portant. However, this article argues that there are procedures and op-
tions courts can implement to protect valid state secrets yet allow cases
brought by extraordinary rendition victims to proceed to the merits.
After examining how federal courts have handled the invocation of the
state secrets privilege in extraordinary rendition cases, this paper will ar-
gue that federal courts’ dismissals of these cases at the pleadings stage
occurs too early. Part I of this article will briefly describe the Ninth Cir-
cuit case Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. to expose flaws in a federal
court’s typical Reynolds analysis in a case brought by alleged victims of
extraordinary rendition that is countered with an assertion of the state
secrets privilege. Part II will provide a more in-depth look at the history
and development of the state secrets doctrine in U.S. law, highlighting
some of its practical nuances through specific examples and demonstrat-
ing its relation to the law of evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Drawing on the Freedom of Information Act, Part III will
examine principles and procedures that courts faced with allegations of
torture and degrading treatment should implement to encourage enforce-
ment of the rule of law and provide justice for plaintiffs while protecting
valid state secrets. Part III will conclude by summarizing the key issues
addressed and takeaways for courts handling such cases in the future.
I. MOHAMED V. JEPPESEN DATAPLAN, INC.: STATE
SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITION
In the most recent extraordinary rendition case decided by a federal
appeals court, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en banc, narrowly upheld, six to five, the district court’s grant of
the government’s motion to dismiss based on the state secrets privilege.16
The plaintiffs alleged that the CIA, along with other government agencies
and foreign governments, operated a program of extraordinary rendition
by apprehending foreign nationals suspected of terrorist activities and
transferring them to foreign countries for detention and interrogation by
United States and foreign officials.17 Each of the five foreign-national
plaintiffs claimed they were subjects of the Extraordinary Rendition Pro-
gram and that the program utilized methods of interrogation prohibited
by both U.S. federal law and international law.18 Notably, the plaintiffs
14. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007).
15. See id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1238 n.3 (4th Cir.
1985).
16. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1073.
17. Id. at 1073.
18. Id. at 1073–74.
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filed a lawsuit against a U.S. corporation, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., under
the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.19 They alleged several theories
of liability based on their contention that the company provided essential
material support to the air transport of plaintiffs while the U.S. govern-
ment processed them through the Extraordinary Rendition Program.20
The plaintiffs’ claims were for (1) forced disappearance and (2) torture
and degrading treatment.21
Before Jeppesen ever answered the plaintiffs’ complaint, the U.S. gov-
ernment moved to intervene and dismiss the case on state secrets privi-
lege grounds.22 It supported its motion with both a classified and an
unclassified declaration that stated that the risk of disclosure of certain
potentially harmful, sensitive material at issue in the case was too great to
allow the litigation to proceed, and thus argued that the case should be
dismissed.23 The district court granted the government’s 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the state secrets
privilege.24 But a three-judge panel at the Ninth Circuit reversed and re-
manded on grounds that the Reynolds evidentiary privilege was not a
proper basis for dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint, though the govern-
ment could assert it at subsequent stages of the litigation.25 The Ninth
Circuit subsequently ordered an en banc rehearing to analyze the applica-
tion and scope of the state secrets privilege de novo.26
Application of the Reynolds analysis by a court generally involves (1)
evaluating whether the procedural requirements for asserting the privi-
lege have been met, (2) independently determining the validity of the
claim of privilege, and if necessary, (3) resolving how the case should
proceed in light of a successful claim of privilege.27 The procedural re-
quirements stipulate that the government is the sole holder of the state
secrets privilege and that assertions of the privilege require a “formal
claim” by the head of the department controlling the material in question
after “personal consideration by that officer.”28 In Jeppesen, the Director
of the CIA, General Michael Hayden, personally lodged the formal claim
of privilege and submitted supporting materials for the court to make an
independent determination.29 The parties did not dispute that General
Hayden met Reynolds’ procedural requirements.30
A court’s next step under Reynolds is to make an independent evalua-
19. Id. at 1075.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1075–76.
22. Id. at 1076.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1077.
26. Id. at 1077.
27. Id. at 1080–83 (describing in detail each of the three steps).
28. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953).
29. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1080.
30. Id. at 1085.
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tion of the claim of privilege.31 A court should sustain a properly asserted
claim of privilege if it concludes, “from all the circumstances of the case,
that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose . . . matters which, in the interest of national security, should not
be divulged.”32 Analyzing the claim under the second step of Reynolds,
the majority concluded that its independent examination of General Hay-
den’s classified and unclassified declarations had revealed at least some
material information that legitimately qualified as state secrets.33 The
court then noted that any detailed explanation of which matters were
covered by the privilege would expose the very secrets the privilege is
designed to protect.34
Without knowing the contents of the government’s classified declara-
tion, and perhaps what was intentionally left out of it, it is concededly
difficult to ascertain exactly what the government was trying to avoid by
invoking the state secrets privilege in Jeppesen. The majority vaguely con-
cluded that the privilege “indisputably” covers information regarding
Jeppesen’s involvement in CIA clandestine intelligence activities and any
other information about the operation of the detention and interrogation
program.35 But filings from the district court’s docket and myriad public
reports reveal an ugly picture of how Jeppesen allegedly assisted the gov-
ernment. For instance, the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleged that
Jeppesen provided logistical and flight planning services for the CIA’s
forcible rendition of terrorism suspects to foreign detention facilities with
full knowledge that they were “facilitat[ing] and profit[ing] from” the
forced disappearance, torture, and other inhumane treatment of these
suspects “in contravention of universally accepted legal standards.”36
Numerous published reports evidence not only Jeppesen’s actual
knowledge that its services assisted the CIA in the forced disappearance
and torture of the plaintiffs, but also that it knowingly misled governmen-
tal and inter-governmental agencies to help the CIA avoid public scru-
tiny. For example, a former Jeppesen employee claimed that Jeppesen
executive Bob Overby told employees at a breakfast meeting that “[w]e
do all the extraordinary rendition flights,” adding that these were “the
torture flights” and “let’s face it, some of these flights end up this way.”37
31. Id. at 1081.
32. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
33. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1086.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at ¶¶ 2, 15, 18, Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2007) (No. 5:07-cv-02798
JW) (“Jeppesen prepared pre-departure flight planning services, including itinerary, route,
weather, and fuel plans for the aircraft involved in their renditions; procured necessary
landing and overflight permits for all legs of the rendition fights; and, through local agents,
arranged fuel and ground handling for the aircraft; filed flight plans with national and
inter-governmental air traffic control authorities; paid passenger fees for the crew; and
made arrangements to secure the safety of the aircraft and crew on the ground.”).
37. Declaration of Sean Belcher in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the United
States’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at ¶¶ 2-4,
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According to the employee, Overby continued, saying, “[T]hat’s just the
way it is, we’re doing them.” He went on to say that the rendition flights
were very lucrative and that the government was unconcerned about the
cost of getting done what it had to get done.38
Moreover, a Council of Europe report describes how Jeppesen inten-
tionally submitted “dummy flights” to European air traffic control au-
thorities to conceal the true flight paths of the rendition planes.39 Based
on public flight records obtained through investigation by the Council of
Europe in conjunction with the European Parliament, the report reveals
that Jeppesen provided support to fifteen planes involved in a total of
seventy extraordinary rendition flights over a four year period beginning
in 2001.40 Despite numerous public revelations from both inside and
outside the United States implicating Jeppesen’s support of extraordinary
rendition, the Jeppesen majority concluded that state secrets, the disclo-
sure of which “could be expected to cause significant harm to national
security,” merited dismissal at the pleadings stage.41
A court’s final step in the Reynolds analysis is to determine how the
successful claim of privilege will affect the proceedings.42 There are three
scenarios, according to the Jeppesen court, where successful application
of the privilege justifies dismissing the case entirely: (1) if the plaintiff’s
prima facie case depends on privileged evidence, (2) if the privilege pre-
cludes the defendant from asserting a valid defense, or (3) if privileged
and non-privileged evidence are so inseparable that litigating the case on
the merits would unjustifiably risk disclosing state secrets.43
Assuming without deciding that invoking the privilege would not pre-
vent the plaintiffs from making out a prima facie case or the defendant
from asserting a valid defense, the court nonetheless concluded that “dis-
missal is . . . required under Reynolds because there is no feasible way to
litigate Jeppesen’s alleged liability without creating an unjustifiable risk
of divulging state secrets.”44 While acknowledging the “plaintiffs’ exten-
sive submission of public documents,” the court reasoned that the “inher-
ently complex and unpredictable” nature of adversarial litigation in an
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) (No.
5:07-cv-02798 JW); Jane Mayer, The CIA’s Travel Agent, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 30,
2006), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/10/30/the-c-i-a-s-travel-agent [https://
perma.cc/V2UX-NPE4].
38. Declaration of Sean Belcher in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the United
States’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at ¶ 4, Mohamed
v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) (No. 5:07-cv-
02798 JW).
39. Eur. Parl. Ass., Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council
of Europe member states: second report, at ¶ 185 (June 7, 2007).
40. First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at ¶ 52, Mohamed v. Jep-
pesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2007) (No. 5:07-cv-02798
JW).
41. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2010).
42. Id. at 1082.
43. Id. at 1083.
44. Id. at 1087.
2016] Extraordinary Results 565
“exceptional case[ ] like this one, where the relevant secrets are difficult
or impossible to isolate . . . would risk disclosure by implication.”45 The
court did recognize that extraordinary rendition itself is not a state secret
and neither are the hundreds of public documents concerning it.46
The result reached in Jeppesen—an outright dismissal at the pleadings
stage—is a striking application of the Reynolds privilege.47 First, the court
essentially held that the risk of divulging something that ought not be
revealed during litigation supersedes the risk of injustice that may result
from dismissal.48 The torture of Binyam Mohamed (Mohamed), the
named plaintiff in the case, was a well-established fact49 at the time the en
banc panel of the Ninth Circuit issued its decision. The government had
previously conceded it and a federal judge had found his allegations to be
true in a habeas corpus proceeding of a fellow detainee at Guanta´namo
Bay.50 There the court found sufficient indicia of reliability in Mohamed’s
allegations that he had in fact endured “lengthy prior torture” that with-
out question occurred “at the behest of the United States.”51
However, the Jeppesen majority concluded that the government’s as-
sertion of the privilege complied with revised standards for its invocation
outlined in a 2009 Justice Department memorandum.52 Those standards
prohibit invoking the privilege for the purposes of, among other things,
“conceal[ing] violations of the law . . . prevent[ing] embarrassment to
a[n] . . . agency of the United States government . . . or prevent[ing] or
delay[ing] the release of information the release of which would not rea-
sonably be expected to cause significant harm to national security.”53 The
majority made assurances that the government’s classified and unclassi-
fied declarations had persuaded it that the government had not invoked
the privilege to avoid scrutiny of particular interrogation techniques or to
45. Id. at 1089.
46. Id. at 1089–90.
47. One legal scholar observed that “the court stretched the privilege to its outer
edges” and that its ruling “represents a breathtaking application of [it].” Steven D.
Schwinn, Ninth Circuit Dismisses Torture Claims Based on State Secrets Privilege, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Sept. 8, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/
09/ninth-circuit-dismisses-torture-claims-based-on-state-secret-privilege.html [https://
perma.cc/ZV4D-CSKC].
48. See ALAN W. CLARKE, RENDITION TO TORTURE 123 (2012).
49. Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp. 2d 38, 64 (D.D.C 2009).
50. Id. at 66.
51. Id. at 64–66 (finding “Binyam Mohamed’s trauma lasted for two long years. Dur-
ing that time, he was physically and psychologically tortured. His genitals were mutilated.
He was deprived of sleep and food. He was summarily transported from one foreign prison
to another. Captors held him in stress positions for days at a time. He was forced to listen
to piercingly loud music and the screams of other prisoners while locked in a pitch-black
cell. All the while, he was forced to inculpate himself and others in various plots to imperil
Americans. The Government does not dispute this evidence.”) (emphasis added).
52. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010).
53. Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Policies and
Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege at 2, OFFICE OF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/
2009/09/23/state-secret-privileges.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX5Q-HCNL] [hereinafter Holder
Memo].
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prevent embarrassment.54
The validity of the underlying allegations and wealth of incriminating
public documentation concerning the events at issue cast doubt on the
majority’s contention.55 In urging that dismissal on the pleadings was in-
appropriate under Reynolds, the five-judge dissent emphasized the dan-
ger of the doctrine “as a means of hiding governmental misbehavior
under the guise of national security.”56 Considering the origins of the
state secrets doctrine in U.S. common law and the high potential for
abuse, courts should reject an unnecessarily deferential response that
leads to outright dismissal in the vast majority of cases.
II. THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE
The origin of the state secrets privilege in U.S. common law did not
arise out of thin air; it is ultimately a consequence of the authority the
Constitution vests in the executive branch under the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers.57 Each branch’s authority to curb an assertion of power of
another branch through a system of checks and balances is necessary for
the proper functioning of our political system, especially where the power
being asserted is not expressly contained within the Constitution. Histori-
cally, courts have shown great deference to the executive branch’s au-
thority over foreign affairs and matters pertaining to national security.58
As other commentators have noted, the state secrets privilege is not ex-
plicitly granted to the executive branch by the Constitution.59 Its use has
been primarily justified, on constitutional grounds, as part of the execu-
tive’s Article II powers over matters of national security.60 The Constitu-
tion provides little guidance for how much deference judges should give
to executive claims of secrecy.61 In the extraordinary rendition context,
some courts have sought to ground the standard for judicial deference in
the executive’s Article II powers, relying on dicta from United States v.
Nixon for the proposition that “courts have traditionally shown the ut-
most deference” to claims of state secrets.62 However, the state secrets
privilege is judge-made law and the principal cases laying out the con-
tours of the privilege prescribe a more nuanced standard of deference.
54. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1090.
55. See CLARKE, supra note 48, at 126.
56. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1094 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
57. See generally Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1935 (2007).
58. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); see U.S. CONST. art. II.
59. See Michael H. Page, Judging Without the Facts: A Schematic for Reviewing State
Secrets Privilege Claims, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1243, 1269 (2008).
60. Id. at 1269–1271.
61. Id.
62. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710; see, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303–04
(4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “[t]he state secrets privilege . . . has a firm foundation in
the Constitution, in addition to its basis in the common law of evidence”).
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A. ORIGINS OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN
U.S. COMMON LAW
In 1949, three widows of civilians killed in an Air Force plane crash
filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government under the Tort Claims Act.63
During pretrial discovery, the plaintiffs filed a Rule 34 motion under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to compel the Air Force’s official acci-
dent investigation report.64 The district court rejected the government’s
initial claim of privilege over the requested materials on grounds that the
plaintiffs had shown good cause for production.65 The Secretary of the
Air Force then filed a separate, formal claim of privilege, objecting to
production “for the reason that the aircraft in question, together with the
personnel on board, were engaged in a highly secret mission of the Air
Force.”66 Both the district court and the court of appeals rejected the
claims of privilege and stipulated the government’s liability for negligence
pursuant to Rule 37.67 Judgment was entered for the plaintiffs and the
issue of whether the government had a valid claim of privilege was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, which issued the primary opinion relied on
by courts in cases where the state secrets privilege is invoked.68
The Supreme Court clarified immediately that the state secrets privi-
lege falls within the concept of “privileges” as that term is used in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the law of evidence.69 With that as
the backdrop, the Court briefly laid out the key features of the privilege
developed at common law that were examined in the discussion of the
Jeppesen case above—the procedural steps that require a “formal claim”
by the head of the department controlling the matter after “personal con-
sideration by that officer” and the “reasonable danger” standard by
which the court judges the validity of the claim.70
The remainder of the Reynolds opinion primarily addresses how much
deference a court should afford the government in determining whether
invocation of the privilege is appropriate.71 This requires a delicate bal-
ance between adequate judicial inquiry to satisfy the court that the cir-
cumstances for the privilege are appropriate while preventing “a
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.”72 Draw-
ing upon the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court proposed a
compromise of deference to the executive without abdicating “[j]udicial
control over the evidence in a case . . . to the caprice of executive of-
63. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1953).
64. Id. at 3; see FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (allowing for a party to serve on another party a
request for non-privileged material).
65. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3–4.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 5; see FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (Failure to Comply with a Court Order).
68. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5–6; see Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070
(9th Cir. 2010); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
69. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6–7.
70. Id. at 7–8.
71. See id. at 8–12.
72. Id. at 8.
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ficers.”73 However, according to the Court, judicial review of the evi-
dence that the government claims as privileged should not be conducted
in every case.74 A court may decide that the claim of privilege is appropri-
ate if it determines “from all the circumstances of the case” that the “rea-
sonable danger” standard has been met.75 If use of privilege is deemed
appropriate under this test, the Court finds it inappropriate for even the
judge to conduct an in camera review.76
The plaintiffs’ showing of necessity for the evidence in question will
determine the amount of scrutiny a court should give to a claim of privi-
lege.77 In Reynolds, the plaintiffs’ showing of need for the accident inves-
tigation report to prove causation was relatively weak because of an
available alternative.78 But even the strongest showing of need cannot
outweigh a valid claim of privilege “if the court is ultimately satisfied that
military [or state] secrets are at stake.”79 It is important to note that al-
though the Court found a valid assertion of the privilege over the acci-
dent investigation report, it did not consider the possibility of dismissal at
the pleadings stage, but rather remanded the case for further proceedings
in the district court.80 Dismissal of an entire case on state secrets grounds
should only be done in exceptional circumstances, as the following mate-
rial illustrates.
Totten v. United States provides a narrow, categorical bar to adjudica-
tion of claims premised on the very existence of a state secret.81 In Totten,
decided in 1876, the estate of a Civil War spy sued the United States for
breach of a contract to compensate the spy for providing espionage ser-
vices to the government during wartime.82 The Supreme Court stated “as
a general principle that public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit
in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclo-
sure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential.”83 The Court
barred the suit entirely because the very existence of an espionage con-
tract with the government was a “fact not to be disclosed.”84 In 2005, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Totten’s general principle that “lawsuits pre-
mised on alleged espionage agreements are altogether forbidden.”85
Other courts have broadened the scope of the Totten bar beyond the




77. Id. at 11.
78. Id. (explaining that the “surviving crew members [were made] available for
examination”).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 12.
81. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105–06 (1875).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 107.
84. Id.
85. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
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context of contracts to perform espionage for the government.86 Most
courts now hold that where “the very subject matter of the action” is “a
matter of state secret,” such as the existence of an espionage contract or a
nuclear weapons storage facility, then an action must be “dismissed on
the pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence.”87 The
Ninth Circuit in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. expressly refused to
decide that case based on Totten, citing difficulties determining the pre-
cise scope of its application.88 Yet the en banc majority’s finding that dis-
missal of the case on the pleadings was appropriate under Reynolds
misguidedly relied on two cases colored by Totten, which are readily
distinguishable.
B. MOHAMED V. JEPPESEN DATAPLAN, INC. REVISITED
In determining that dismissal on the pleadings was appropriate under
Reynolds, the Jeppesen court misguidedly relied on the Fourth Circuit
case El-Masri v. United States and the Ninth Circuit case Al-Haramain
Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush. The facts from El-Masri are very similar
to those in Jeppesen and do not merit discussion here. The El-Masri
court, relying on the dicta from Nixon that executive claims of secrecy
should be accorded “utmost deference” pursuant to Article II, reasoned
that the state secrets privilege “has a firm foundation in the Constitu-
tion.”89 In an opinion that conflated Totten with Reynolds, the court took
an expansive view of the “very subject matter” principle from Totten,
holding that dismissal is required under Totten if the case cannot be “liti-
gated without threatening the disclosure of [ ] state secrets.”90
Moreover, the Jeppesen court erroneously relied on Al-Haramain for
the proposition that cases not falling within the purview of Totten may
still be appropriately dismissed under Reynolds in certain circum-
stances.91 In Al-Haramain, the plaintiffs’ entire case was contingent upon
their obtaining a sealed document in possession of the government.92
There, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case on the pleadings after deter-
mining that the critical document was a matter of state secrets.93 Unlike
the case in Jeppesen, the Al-Haramain court concluded that while the
86. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S.
139, 146–147 (1981) (Plaintiffs sought to compel an environmental impact statement from
the Navy under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 regarding a military facility
where the Navy allegedly proposed to store nuclear weapons. The Court held that the
allegations were “beyond judicial scrutiny” because, “[d]ue to national security reasons, . . .
the Navy can neither admit nor deny that it proposes to store nuclear weapons at [the
facility].”) (citing Totten, 92 U.S. at 107).
87. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953).
88. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1085 (9th Cir. 2010).
89. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2007).
90. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
91. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1089.
92. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (ex-
plaining that “[the plaintiff] has indicated that its ability to establish injury in fact hinges
entirely on a privileged document”).
93. Id.
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very subject matter of the suit was not a state secret, the plaintiff lacked
standing, and thus its claim had to be dismissed.94 The Jeppesen major-
ity’s reliance on both El-Masri and Al-Haramain does not satisfy the re-
quirements to justify dismissal under Reynolds.
While dismissal is acceptable under the narrow “very subject matter”
test of Totten, or in an exceptional case like Al-Haramain where the
plaintiff lacks standing altogether, the result reached in Jeppesen
stretched the state secrets doctrine to a new limit. Jeppesen answered a
question under the guise of a Reynolds-only analysis that is not expressly
contemplated by Reynolds: whether the case must be dismissed entirely
as a result of the successful claim of privilege.95 Courts have often relied
on a mosaic theory as justification for upholding assertions of the state
secrets privilege.96 “The significance of one item of information,” one ar-
ticulation of the theory goes, “may frequently depend upon knowledge of
many other items of information,”97 which, when pieced together like a
“jigsaw puzzle,”98 illustrate the reasonable danger to national security in-
terests that disclosure could pose. The theory is premised on the belief
that only the executive—it having authority over national security pol-
icy—is competent to judge the significance of individual items of informa-
tion.99 If a court finds that an item of information is a state secret based
on a Reynolds analysis in light of the mosaic theory, and that item is es-
sential to the plaintiff’s case, then dismissal should logically be appropri-
ate under Reynolds.
But instead of proceeding to discovery and scrutinizing the govern-
ment’s assertion of the privilege over individual items of evidence, the
Jeppesen court relied on the mosaic of extraordinary rendition upfront to
deny an entire case on the grounds that the facts underlying the plaintiffs’
claims are too intertwined with state secrets to risk going forward at
all.100 The court relied exclusively on the government’s public and classi-
fied declarations to determine that dismissal is appropriate because
“there is no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen’s alleged liability without
creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets.”101 But the plain-
tiffs had not made a showing of need for particular evidence and the gov-
ernment had not filed an answer to their complaint. The court deferred to
the government’s view of the mosaic because there was a chance that the
government or the court might make a mistake causing disclosure of state
94. Id. at 1198, 1205.
95. See supra Part II.
96. See Herring v. United States, No. Civ.A.03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 WL 2040272, at
*5 (Sept. 10, 2004); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Halkin v. Helms
598 F.2d 1, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Halkin I].
97. Halkin I at 8–9.
98. Herring, WL 2040272 at *5.
99. Page, supra note 59, at 1267–69.
100. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010).
101. Id. at 1088.
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secrets during discovery.102
Claims of secrecy at this stage of the litigation, as the five-judge dissent
in Jeppesen pointed out, are “necessarily broad and hypothetical” be-
cause they are grounded in speculation about how the litigation might
proceed.103 Reynolds makes clear that “[j]udicial control over the evi-
dence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive of-
ficers.”104 Rather than remanding the case for further factual findings on
Jeppesen’s ability to defend itself using non-privileged evidence, dismissal
made abdication of judicial control over the evidence the precise result in
this case. Where a court decides or assumes that a plaintiff’s prima facie
case and a defendant’s defenses may not inevitably depend on privileged
evidence, as is the case in both Reynolds and Jeppesen,105 the court
should not dismiss the case at the pleadings stage. Fear of “compelled or
inadvertent disclosure”106 due to mistake during discovery is not the test;
the test, rather, is if compulsion of evidence is allowed, whether it will
expose “military matters, which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged.”107 As a former federal judge aptly noted, “In an
age when it can be argued that just about every sliver of information has
some connection with intelligence and national security, too much judi-
cial deference may be as great a danger to popular government as too
little.”108
C. THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SUPPORT
ADJUDICATING CLAIMS OF STATE SECRETS DURING
DISCOVERY
In light of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Reynolds supports the
conclusion that deciding what is, or is not, indispensable to a party’s claim
or defense in a case should be saved for discovery where the subject mat-
ter itself is not a state secret.109 Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires a plaintiff to state a claim for relief that contains “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to
relief.”110 The primary function of the claim under Rule 8(a) has tradi-
102. Id. at 1095 n.4 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (“Dismissing this suit out of fear of ‘com-
pelled or inadvertent disclosure’ of secret information during the course of litigation as-
sumes that the government might make mistakes in what it produces, or that district courts
might compel the disclosure of documents legitimately covered by the state secrets
privilege.”).
103. Id. at 1096 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
104. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953).
105. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12 (holding that “the case will be remanded to the Dis-
trict Court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion”);
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1087 (“we assume without deciding that plaintiffs’ prima facie case
and Jeppesen’s defenses may not inevitably depend on privileged evidence”).
106. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1087.
107. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
108. The Honorable Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U.
PITT. L. REV. 753, 761 (1988).
109. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1090 (“We do not hold that the existence of the ex-
traordinary rendition program itself is a state secret.”).
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
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tionally been to give notice to the defendants.111 However, the practice of
notice pleading has been called into question after Bell Atlantic Corpora-
tion v. Twombly112 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal113 interpreted Rule 8(a) to be a
“plausibility” pleading standard, requiring more developed factual allega-
tions to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.114 In Jeppesen, the
Ninth Circuit, on rehearing en banc, assumed that the plaintiffs could
plead a legally sufficient prima facie case without use of privileged evi-
dence.115 The CIA had declassified documents describing extraordinary
rendition and particular interrogation techniques to which the plaintiffs
allege they were subjected.116 Jeppesen’s admitted involvement was well
publicized;117 numerous investigative reports by European officials con-
firm that fact.118 Further, courts in the United States and United King-
dom had acknowledged the fact of Mohamed’s torture, which the
government had not disputed.119
The court’s task in its rehearing should have been to review the district
court’s grant of the government’s motion to dismiss by weighing the legal
sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ complaint.120 In granting that motion, the dis-
trict court cited Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules, which calls for dismis-
sal for “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” because the court found that
the “very subject matter of the case [was] a state secret.”121 On appeal,
the original three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of
the 12(b)(1) motion, concluding that the “very subject matter” was not a
state secret and further that Reynolds could not be the basis for a Rule
12(b)(6) motion for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted” either.122 As numerous courts have demonstrated, the purpose
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of the complaint and
not to resolve any factual disputes or to assess the plaintiff’s likelihood to
win.123 But assertion of an evidentiary privilege is not meant to test the
sufficiency of a complaint; instead, its relevance concerns whether evi-
dence is available to later support that complaint.124 Thus, a well-pleaded
111. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004).
112. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
113. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
114. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 111, at § 1202 (3d ed. Supp. 2015).
115. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010).
116. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants on Rehearing En Banc at 18–21, Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15693).
117. See Mayer, supra note 37.
118. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants on Rehearing En Banc at 22-24, Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15693).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 47–49; R (Binyam Mohamed) v. Sec’y of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] EWCA Civ 65.
120. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1095 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
121. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135–36 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
122. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 949, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) (quot-
ing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6)).
123. 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 111 at § 1356.
124. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1099 (Hawkins, J., dissenting); Jeppesen, 579 F.3d at 961.
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complaint and a responsive pleading should be prerequisites for invoca-
tion of the state secrets privilege, barring exceptional circumstances.
Changing the status quo will require courts to enforce principles and
procedures that more closely scrutinize assertions of the state secrets
privilege. The interests in accountability and justice merit the additional
cost that it will take to relieve the clash of values inherent in invocation of
the privilege. While there is no clear answer as to how courts can ensure
that secrecy is maintained and justice is done, the following section will
examine the underlying tension more deeply and offer proposals to im-
prove the current state of affairs.
III. INHERENT PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUS QUO AND
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR CHANGE
A. THE SECRECY DILEMMA
Robert Chesney, in a recent article, describes the post-Nixon era in
1975 as a time in which Watergate and abusive surveillance practices had
caused public confidence in government to fall to its lowest ebb in
years.125 The public mood at that time highlights “[t]he Secrecy Di-
lemma”—the “clash of values implicit in the government’s invocation of
the state secrets privilege.”126 Attorney General Edward Levi, speaking
to an audience at the Bar Association of New York City in 1975, recog-
nized that the need for governmental secrecy comes at a price to account-
ability and the democratic process.127 And, this tension between claims of
secrecy for security reasons and the public’s right to know is heightened
when an individual plaintiff is seeking redress in court for alleged govern-
ment wrongdoing.128 Chesney explains that what is at stake in cases in-
volving individual litigants is not merely generalized democratic
accountability, but “enforcement of the rule of law itself.”129
It may seem that proceeding to discovery in extraordinary rendition
cases merely delays the inevitable because assertions of the state secrets
privilege during discovery will ultimately lead to dismissal, only at ex-
ceedingly greater cost. Yet denying victims of extraordinary rendition the
opportunity to even establish the legal sufficiency of their complaints tilts
the balance of competing interests too far in favor of the government.130
Academic criticism of the state secrets privilege has emphasized the grave
potential for abuse when the judiciary does not provide an adequate
check on its invocation. One writer’s observation that an “incentive to
keep secrets is that national security secrecy ends public inquiry into alle-
gations of misconduct” appears to be extremely relevant in extraordinary
125. Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1263-64 (2007).
126. Id. at 1263.
127. Id. at 1263–66.
128. Id. at 1266.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1266, 1314.
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rendition cases where there are underlying allegations of torture and de-
grading treatment.131 Over time, courts have rejected the principle that
the privilege cannot be invoked in response to allegations of unlawful
government conduct.132 Nevertheless, federal courts should more closely
scrutinize governmental assertions of the privilege than is currently hap-
pening under the status quo to uphold the rule of law and prevent gov-
ernmental abuse.
This article proposes that by following some of the procedures and
principles of the Freedom of Information Act, courts in extraordinary
rendition cases can tilt the balance of competing interests back toward
democratic accountability and enforcement of the rule of law. In 1967,
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to promote
governmental accountability and protect the public’s right to know about
governmental operations within executive branch agencies.133 FOIA pro-
vides broad public access to records from federal agencies to support the
public’s generalized right to know about their government and is subject
to nine exemptions whereby the governmental agency with control over
the information at issue can exempt it from disclosure.134 Exemption one,
which is most relevant to the state secrets privilege, makes FOIA inappli-
cable to records “to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy” when such matters are properly classified by the executive
under criteria set by executive order.135 Congress strengthened FOIA
post-Watergate with the passage of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act),
which encourages more judicial scrutiny of government exemption claims
under FOIA.136
While the purpose of FOIA is not to directly benefit plaintiffs in
court,137 it can greatly impact privileges and discovery in litigation in a
number of ways.138 First, FOIA exemptions help define an outer bound-
ary to government privileges.139 Second, FOIA strengthens the judiciary’s
position in compelling disclosure of information.140 Third, FOIA specifi-
cally authorizes judicial review in camera of records over which the gov-
ernment has claimed an exemption and, further, calls upon the agency to
131. Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Un-
necessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 153 (2006).
132. See Chesney, supra note 125, at 1295.
133. See Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
134. What is FOIA?, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov/about.html [https://perma.cc/
9GJL-SZLJ].
135. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)(B) (2012).
136. 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 5:53 (3d ed. 2007).
137. CAUSE OF ACTION: ADVOCATES FOR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY, GRADING
THE GOVERNMENT: A LOOK AT HOW FEDERAL AGENCIES MEASURE UP ON FOIA RE-
QUESTS Vol. I 5 (2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20150428103643/ http://gradingthegov-
ernment.com/wp-content/uploads/GTG_Final1.pdf (reporting that a study of 16 federal
agencies revealed an average FOIA response time of 75 days).
138. 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 136, § 5:53.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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prove its claim of exemption.141 FOIA can be used in two ways to allevi-
ate the heightened tension of the secrecy dilemma in extraordinary rendi-
tion cases: (1) as a supplementary tool to support allegations of unlawful
government conduct and expose governmental changes in policy and (2)
as a model of specific procedures and principles that, if adopted by
courts, would better ensure enforcement of the rule of law.
B. FOIA AS A PERSUASIVE SUPPLEMENTARY TOOL
One need look no further than Reynolds itself to see how a successful
FOIA request exposed an abuse of the state secrets privilege and supple-
mented a plaintiff’s claim against the federal government. Nearly fifty
years after Reynolds, family members of the crash victims filed repeated,
persistent requests under FOIA for the accident investigation report that
had been withheld pursuant to the state secrets privilege.142 The efforts of
the family members and others with similar interests eventually led the
Air Force to declassify the report at issue in Reynolds.143 The victims’
family members found to their dismay that the accident investigation re-
port, which formed the basis for the modern articulation of the state
secrets privilege, lacked any detailed information about a secret mission
or secret equipment.144 Instead, the report contained information about
the government’s negligence in maintaining the plane, including names of
those who were at fault.145
One of the family members subsequently filed suit against the U.S.
government under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), claiming that
the settlement reached fifty years earlier in Reynolds was procured
through a fraudulent claim of privilege.146 The court considered the con-
tents of the accident investigation report, now a matter of public record,
in determining whether to grant the government’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss.147 The plaintiff there was unsuccessful in proving fraud on the
court under Rule 60(b).148 However, the case illustrates both how easily
governmental agencies can mislead courts when asserting the privilege
and how courts take into consideration matters of public record support-
ing plaintiffs’ allegations when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
FOIA can be a persuasive supplementary tool for litigants challenging
a governmental assertion of the state secrets privilege in two powerful
ways. First, FOIA is a powerful tool for obtaining governmental records
that plaintiffs in extraordinary rendition cases can use to challenge a Rule
141. Id.
142. LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDEN-
TIAL POWER AND THE Reynolds Case 165-66 (2006).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 167–68.
145. Id. at 166.
146. See Herring v. United States, No. Civ.A.03–CV–5500–LDD, 2004 WL 2040272, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004).
147. Id. at *7.
148. Id. at *4.
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12(b) motion to dismiss and to supplement evidence obtained during dis-
covery. In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, courts may consider “matters of
public record . . . items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits
attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned.”149 To this
point, however, public documentation about extraordinary rendition has
added very little persuasive punch to plaintiffs’ arguments for survival
against a 12(b) motion to dismiss. Second, FOIA disclosures serve as an
indicator of governmental policy regarding the sensitivity of certain items.
Courts should be wary when the government makes blanket assertions of
the state secrets privilege over subject matter that has been widely ex-
posed through FOIA requests.
Thousands of pages of documents obtained through FOIA requests ex-
pose specific details about the CIA’s Extraordinary Rendition Program,
including specific torture methods and techniques.150 For example, a de-
classified CIA Inspector General’s Report from May 7, 2004, entitled
“Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities” describes
specific confinement and interrogation methods.151 And, a declassified
CIA “Background Paper” describes the specific manner in which detain-
ees were transported to CIA black sites as part of the rendition pro-
gram.152 The document describes how detainees experience “significant
apprehension . . . because of the enormity and suddenness of the change
in environment” and “the uncertainty about what will happen next” while
being “flown to a Black Site . . . securely shackled and . . . deprived of
sight and sound through the use of blindfolds, earmuffs, and hoods.”153
Moreover, the plaintiffs in Jeppesen proffered hundreds of pages of non-
secret information, including media reports, flight records, and foreign
investigations, to support their allegations that Jeppesen provided flight
and logistical support to extraordinary rendition that they knew or rea-
sonably should have known would result in plaintiffs’ being tortured.154
Yet even the mountain of publicly available information did not assuage
the fears of the Jeppesen court that proceeding with the case posed an
unjustifiable risk of disclosing state secrets.155
Beyond their value in supporting allegations of government miscon-
duct, FOIA-obtained documents revealing specific detention and interro-
gation means and methods signify a broader policy shift that cuts through
the reasoning of the Jeppesen court. The amount and type of information
about extraordinary rendition in the public realm changed significantly
149. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 111, at § 1357 (3d ed. 2004).
150. The Torture Database, ACLU, https://www.thetorturedatabase.org [perma.cc/
JE2L-YDNJ] (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
151. Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (May 7,
2004), https://fas.org/irp/cia/product/ig-interrog.pdf [perma.cc/J2D6-UTVJ].




154. Mohamed v. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d 1070, 1089, 1102–1131 (9th Cir. 2010).
155. See id. at 1089–90.
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from the time of General Hayden’s first formal claim of privilege in the
case to the time the Ninth Circuit conducted the en banc rehearing.156 By
the time the final disposition of the case was underway, General Hay-
den’s claim of privilege rested on an outdated premise that the CIA’s
detention and interrogation program was one of the government’s most
important tools in combating terrorism.157 To the contrary, President
Obama had formally eliminated the detention and interrogation program
and ordered the CIA to close any currently operating detention facilities
in a 2009 Executive Order entitled “Ensuring Lawful Interrogations.”158
Further, the president declassified key memos in addition to the FOIA-
obtained documents mentioned above that confirm interrogation meth-
ods like “prolonged sleep deprivation, forced nudity, dietary manipula-
tion, and stress positions.”159
Two additional points that accentuate the significance of this policy
shift should provide greater persuasive force to plaintiffs seeking to over-
come a motion to dismiss based on the state secrets privilege. First, when
put into perspective, FOIA-obtained documents containing gritty details
about extraordinary rendition are noteworthy not just for their content,
but for the fact that they were released at all. This is because, in the years
following 9/11, the government proved to be nearly impervious to attacks
by FOIA requesters, especially in cases involving exemption one.160 In a
2001 memorandum, Attorney General John Ashcroft gave the following
message to executive agencies regarding FOIA requests: “[Y]ou can be
assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless
they lack a sound legal basis.”161 Rhetoric from other Bush Administra-
tion officials showed support for the policy promulgated by the Attorney
General that harm to national security, rather than openness, should be
presumed.162 Second, among those executive agencies that have
processed FOIA requests, the CIA has consistently been the most resis-
tant to grant requests and the most impervious to court ordered disclo-
sure.163 In CIA v. Sims, the Supreme Court endorsed a highly deferential
view to CIA withholding decisions, stating that “the Director [of Central
Intelligence] . . . has power to withhold superficially innocuous informa-
156. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants on Rehearing En Banc at 18–21, Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15693).
157. Id. at 19.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 20.
160. David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 637–38 (2005).
161. Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Oct. 12, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/011012.htm
[https://perma.cc/L9KW-WYMB].
162. See Memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight
Office, to Departments and Agencies (March 19, 2002), http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/
wh031902.html [https://perma.cc/N734-BMNA] (instructing agencies to take “appropriate
actions to safeguard sensitive but unclassified information related to America’s homeland
security”).
163. Pozen, supra note 160, at 635, 638.
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tion on the ground that it might enable an observer to discover [through
mosaic-making] the identity of an intelligence source” and that the CIA
Director’s decisions “are worthy of great deference.”164
The declassification of documents related to enhanced interrogation
and detention marks a shift in government policy that should favor plain-
tiffs seeking similar information from the government during discovery.
Under Exemption Five of FOIA, the same privileges that the government
routinely asserts in the civil litigation context may be asserted to deny a
FOIA request.165 In theory, plaintiffs who make a particularized showing
of need during discovery should have greater access to privileged infor-
mation than a FOIA requester where such a showing will not help.166
Declassification of information about rendition through FOIA demon-
strates a shift toward greater transparency on the subject and should thus
increase a plaintiff’s ability to compel related information from the gov-
ernment during discovery where a particularized showing of need exists.
Given what is known about extraordinary rendition, Jeppesen’s in-
volvement, and Mohamed’s torture as a matter of public record, the more
unjustifiable risk lies in allowing a potential abuse of the privilege to go
unchecked to the detriment of enforcement of the rule of law. In addition
to FOIA’s value as a supplementary tool and indicator of policy change,
its principles and procedures should serve as a model for courts handling
assertions of the state secrets privilege in the extraordinary rendition
context.
C. THE FOIA MODEL FOR COMPELLING INFORMATION FROM THE
GOVERNMENT
The Obama Administration has issued a number of guidelines and ex-
planatory materials to assist executive agencies in complying with (or de-
nying) FOIA requests. In a 2009 memorandum, the president stated
unequivocally that “[t]he Freedom of Information Act should be adminis-
tered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness
prevails.”167 The president called upon executive agencies not to withhold
information on account of embarrassing facts, mistakes, and failures or
because of “speculative or abstract fears.”168 A variety of procedures
contribute to carrying out the presumption of openness that in practice
has led to the declassification of thousands of pages of documents con-
cerning extraordinary rendition.169
164. CIA vs. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178–79 (1985); see also Pozen, supra note 160, at 643.
165. P. STEPHEN GIDIERE III, THE FEDERAL INFORMATION MANUAL: HOW THE GOV-
ERNMENT COLLECTS, MANAGES, AND DISCLOSES INFORMATION UNDER FOIA AND OTHER
STATUTES 332 (2006).
166. Id.
167. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed.
Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).
168. Id.
169. The Torture Database, supra note 150.
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FOIA strengthens the judiciary’s position in compelling disclosure and
authorizes judicial review in camera of records over which the govern-
ment has claimed an exemption.170 Litigation to compel disclosure under
FOIA does not occur until a request has been made and records are im-
properly withheld.171 The court reviews the agency’s decision to withhold
de novo and the agency must overcome the presumption of openness by
justifying its claim of exemption.172 In a suit to obtain compliance with a
FOIA request seeking information about rendition, treatment, and
deaths of detainees in U.S. custody, a U.S. district court ordered the De-
partment of Defense to produce the requested documents or “a log iden-
tifying each and a specific claim of exemption.”173 Moreover, “[a]s to
documents the existence of which the government contends it may be
unable to confirm or deny, procedures can be established to identify such
documents in camera or to a special master with proper clearance.”174
Ultimately, this litigation led to disclosure of the CIA’s “Counterterror-
ism Detention and Interrogation Activities,” which detailed egregious in-
terrogation techniques that prompted a criminal investigation regarding
CIA mistreatment of detainees abroad.175
Procedures utilized in this example of FOIA litigation could be valua-
ble tools for courts handling assertions of privilege. The Vaughn index, or
privilege log, forces a government agency to provide an exemption for
each specific record or portion of record it seeks to withhold and an ac-
companying affidavit to explain the decision.176 Agencies are required to
disclose “any reasonably segregable portion of a record” even if other
portions are exempt.177 Courts in extraordinary rendition cases should
adopt a similar approach to force the government to assert privilege
claims over specific documents. Individuals seeking records in a typical
FOIA request must “reasonably describe[ ]” the records sought.178
Describing features of a particular document or explaining a requester’s
needs should suffice, even if broadly stated.179 Similarly, in complex civil
litigation, document requests must describe each individual item or cate-
gory of items with “reasonable particularity.”180
170. See supra text accompanying notes 140–41; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012).
172. Id.
173. ACLU v. Dep’t of Defense, 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
174. Id. at 504.




176. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (outlining a system of
itemizing and indexing to support specific claims of exemptions as to particular portions of
the document).
177. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
178. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
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Had the Jeppesen case proceeded to discovery, there was adequate in-
formation available to describe needed documents with reasonable par-
ticularity during discovery. Beyond the public records, Mohamed kept a
detailed diary of his rendition experience, including approximate dates
and the physical descriptions of his captors, and the government had con-
ceded his torture in an earlier case.181 Further, all the plaintiffs had suffi-
cient knowledge of their personal experiences182 that would allow them
to make specific showings of need, such that the documents would not be
difficult to describe. Assertion of privilege over documents relating to
their rendition could be vetted via a Vaughn indexing procedure, fol-
lowed by in camera review of documents the existence of which the gov-
ernment could neither confirm nor deny.
In certain cases in the Exemption One context, courts have not re-
quired a Vaughn index if it would reveal classified information itself.183
Executive agencies, in response to requests for information in the Ex-
emption One category, have in some cases responded with what is termed
a “Glomar denial.”184 A Glomar response is simply a refusal by the exec-
utive agency to either confirm or deny the existence of requested docu-
ments.185 The underlying rationale in the FOIA context is that even
acknowledging the existence of a requested record would “reveal classi-
fied sources or methods of obtaining foreign intelligence.”186 Yet the
court in Bassiouni, a FOIA case denying the requester a Vaughn index,
indicated that had the requester asked the court for an in camera review
of any existing records about him, the court could have judged his request
by that method.187 Courts have broad discretion to conduct in camera
examinations of records in FOIA cases as a result of the 1974
amendments.188
In Jeppesen, Mohamed’s request for information relating to his transfer
from Moroccan to American custody and subsequent detention in a CIA
“dark prison,” for instance, would likely be met with a Glomar response
from the government. But given the broad public knowledge of the
sources and methods of extraordinary rendition and Jeppesen’s involve-
ment in it, not to mention President Obama’s formal elimination of the
program, greater use of in camera review would be helpful to ensure that
the government’s assertion is valid. In addition, courts have employed use
of a special master to review privilege claims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53 when the judge lacks the time or ability to effectively assess
181. Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp. 2d 38, 62 (D.D.C. 2009).
182. First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at ¶¶ 90–235, Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2007) (No. 5:07-cv-02798
JW).
183. See Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 2004).
184. John Y. Gotanda, Glomar Denials Under FOIA: A Problematic Privilege and a
Proposed Alternative Procedure of Review, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 166 (1994).
185. Id.
186. Bassiouni, 392 F.3d at 246.
187. Id. at 247–48.
188. GIDIERE, supra note 165, at 312.
2016] Extraordinary Results 581
the claim.189
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal courts have dramatically altered the scope and function of the
state secrets privilege in extraordinary rendition cases, causing premature
dismissal of well-pleaded complaints. This is especially true when the very
subject matter of the suit is not a state secret and the parties’ claims and
defenses do not inevitably depend on privileged matter, as was the case in
Jeppesen.190 What is a common law evidentiary privilege has transformed
into something more akin to an immunity doctrine.191 Rethinking the
way courts handle invocations of the privilege could result in fewer dis-
missals on the pleadings in many types of cases while still maintaining the
government’s valid interest in not disclosing truly sensitive information.
Reforming Reynolds could help clarify the courts’ role in reviewing
claims of state secrets and provide greater uniformity and fairness in judi-
cial decision-making in this area.
Plaintiffs’ necessity for information the government controls in ex-
traordinary rendition cases is highly compelling as a general proposition.
That necessity combined with allegations of torture and what is known
about extraordinary rendition from government disclosures should,
“from all the circumstances in the case,”192 prompt deeper judicial in-
quiry into the true motivation for the privilege’s invocation. The Justice
Department itself has stated in clear terms that it will not defend use of
the privilege to hide governmental wrongdoing.193 In keeping with the
Obama Administration’s theme of eliminating unlawful interrogation and
detention techniques and promoting transparency about them, courts
should remain highly skeptical of governmental assertions of the privilege
in cases like Jeppesen where the motivation to conceal wrongdoing and
embarrassment appears exceedingly high. The clear policy shift in the ex-
ecutive branch that has led to the disclosure of numerous documents
describing extraordinary rendition should further bolster this skepticism
and cause courts to probe deeper into invocation of the state secrets
privilege.
FOIA may provide a powerful tool for litigants seeking to overcome
assertions of the state secrets privilege in extraordinary rendition and
other national security cases for both its ability to supplement discovery
and for its procedures that could serve as a model for courts handling
such cases. As a supplementary tool, FOIA requests have already pro-
duced thousands of pages of documents concerning the extraordinary
rendition program.194 Further, the increase in FOIA disclosures along
189. Id. at 341.
190. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010).
191. See id. at 1098 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
192. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
193. Holder Memo, supra note 53, at 2.
194. See supra text accompanying note 150.
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with other measures that the Obama Administration has taken to stop
unlawful detention and interrogation signify a policy shift toward trans-
parency that should favor litigants challenging government conduct in
federal court in this area.195
Procedures for asserting and responding to requests for records under
FOIA may provide a framework for courts burdened with the difficult
task of weighing significant public and private interests in privilege cases.
Courts in extraordinary rendition cases, where an interest arguably much
greater than the public’s right to know is at stake,196 should adopt some
of these principles to encourage enforcement of the rule of law. Specifi-
cally, a presumption of openness should prevail and courts should make
greater use of in camera review of specific documents as well as a Vaughn
indexing procedure. As scholar Henry Shue put it, an intolerance for se-
cret torture programs may lead to acts of terror that harm the public, but
at least “civilized principles will survive for future generations, who may
be grateful for our sacrifice so that they could lead decent lives.”197
195. See supra Part III(B),(C).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 128–29.
197. Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb, 37 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L. L. 231, 239 (2006).
